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The Moral Cost of Compensatory
Damage Claims in Reproductive
Negligence Cases

DAVID WASSERMAN*

INTRODUCTION
In this original and important work, Dov Fox makes a compelling case
for rethinking and reformulating the way that negligent conduct by
reproductive health professionals is understood, and in the way the harms
resulting from that misconduct are rectified.1 He seeks a unified account
of this negligence and harm that recognizes the “gravamen of the offense” as
the wrongful interference with reproductive planning while also
recognizing three distinct categories of adverse outcomes: deprived, imposed,
and confounded procreation. Fox argues that the injuries in each category
differ from each other sufficiently to justify the recognition of three distinct
torts.2
To unsympathetic courts, it has seemed like wrongful-birth plaintiffs
are trying to have their cake and eat it too, enjoying the benefits of the
tort—an intimate parental relationship with a beloved, if initially unwanted,
child—while seeking damages for conduct that was necessary for that
benefit. The plaintiffs confront what has been called the “paradox” of
wrongful birth: they seek compensation for wrongful acts whose foreseen
*
© 2021 David Wasserman. Visiting Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy,
University of Maryland, College Park, MD.
1. DOV FOX, BIRTH RIGHTS AND WRONGS: HOW MEDICINE AND TECHNOLOGY ARE
REMAKING REPRODUCTION AND THE LAW (2019) [hereinafter F OX, BIRTH RIGHTS AND
WRONGS].
2. Id. at 99–139.
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outcome they would not now wish to undo. 3 Fox seeks to avoid this
conundrum by shifting the focus from the result—the allegedly “wrongful
birth” of a child the parents love and cherish—to the negligent interference
with their prior planning. He is, however, understandably reluctant to
ignore the consequences of that interference in assessing damages, and he
insists that plaintiffs be able to recover compensation for the specific harms
they sought to avoid, compensation that would vary with the magnitude
of the harm that they or their family incurred.4
But there is a moral cost to allowing compensation for reproductive
negligence. In seeking compensatory damages, the plaintiffs are not only
demanding redress for the affront to their autonomy, however wisely it
may have been exercised; they are treating the consequences they sought
to avoid by that exercise as harms for which they deserve to be compensated.
But many of those consequences are inseparable from the child they now
love and cherish, in the sense that they could not have had that child
without those consequences. There is thus a tension between the demand for
compensation and the attitude of unconditional love and acceptance the
plaintiffs aspire to maintain towards their child. I will argue that that tension
can be mitigated, but cannot be fully resolved so long as reproductive
negligence is regarded as a compensable wrong.
First, however, I will suggest that this tension could be avoided or
significantly reduced by allowing only punitive and reliance damages for
confounded and imposed reproduction. I will argue that the demand for
compensatory damages in those cases, however reasonable in other respects,
requires parents to affirm their earlier decision to avoid the birth of the type
of child, or number of children, they now have. While this does not explicitly
treat the birth of those children as “wrongful,” it gives rise to the kind of
tension Fox sought to avoid in developing the alternative tort of reproductive
negligence.
After arguing for this claim in more detail, I will place the demand for
compensatory damages in the context of a family of cases that pit the
acknowledgement of present benefits against the condemnation of the
wrongs responsible for them. I will then examine several attempts in the
philosophical literature to address a challenge akin to that raised by the
3. Id. at 40–47, 90–91. I regard these as harder cases than those in which the plaintiff
parents do wish the injury undone, as in the negligent failure to prenatally prevent or
diagnose a condition like Tay Sachs, that arguably results in a life not worth living. There is not
even an apparent paradox here, since although the parents love the child, they regret its
birth and wish for the child’s sake that it had never been born. The basis for damages here
is straightforward, or at least far less “paradoxical” than in the more common cases where
the parents emphatically do not regret the birth of this disabled or unrelated child and
emphatically do not wish that they had not brought it into existence.
4. FOX, BIRTH RIGHTS AND WRONGS, supra note 2, at 128–39.
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demand for compensation in confounded procreation cases: to reconcile
the affirmation of a prior judgment that a certain type of child should not
be born, or would be too burdensome to bear, with the unalloyed joy and
lack of regret many parents claim to feel at the birth of such a child. I will
argue that to the extent these attempts are successful at avoiding or blunting
offense to that child, they fail to justify compensation for the unavoidable
costs of the child’s existence.
My conclusion is not that the law should bar compensatory damages for
reproductive negligence, or even that parents should not seek such damages,
only that the moral cost of their doing so may be greater than Fox
acknowledges. I will suggest that the best way to avoid this moral cost is
for the state to reduce the need for legal claims that incur it, by absorbing
many of the expenses of raising children, especially disabled children,
now borne by their parents—giving victims of reproductive negligence
less incentive, and need, to seek compensation.
THE ROAD NOT TAKEN
A tort that concerned itself strictly with vindicating the plaintiff’s
violated autonomy would not require either the plaintiff to claim, or the
court to assess, actual damages. The plaintiff would not be endorsing or
affirming the specific choice that was thwarted by the defendant’s
negligence but her authority to have made that choice, whether or not she
now regards it as a wise one. Her posture would be similar that that of an
individual who objects to paternalistic interference with a choice she had
autonomously made—whether or not she would make that choice now. It
was her choice to make, even if she made it badly, and the paternalistic
intervention violated her autonomy, even if it resulted in a better outcome.
At an extreme, such a tort would not distinguish among Fox’s three
kinds of reproductive harm, treating imposition, denial, and confounding
as serious autonomy violations. A less extreme form of neutrality would
make a categorical distinction between reproduction denied and imposed, on
the one hand, and reproduction confounded, on the other. It could be
argued that, at least in the case of plaintiffs who were not yet parents, the
decision to become or avoid becoming a parent was an “existential” one,
whose neglectful disregard constituted a greater autonomy violation than
the confounding of the plans made by plaintiffs who sought and succeeded in
becoming parents.
Further distinctions could be made, but they would have to be based on
the (expressed or reasonably assumed) importance to the plaintiffs of the
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plan, not the harm that resulted from the negligent failure to implement it.
Despite the obviously close association between the two, they may diverge,
and if they do, what matters is only the importance to the plaintiff of
the thwarted plan. Thus, parents who made it clear that they would rather
have no child than a slightly disabled one would suffer a greater autonomy
violation from the defendant’s negligence than would plaintiffs who
made it clear that, while they had a strong desire for a nondisabled child, that
they would rather have a severely disabled one than no child at all.
As this last contrast suggests, however, it might be problematic for
courts to gauge the magnitude of the autonomy violation in terms of the
subjective importance of the plaintiffs’ plans. Prospective parents may
attach great importance to what most of us would regard as frivolous or
toxic preferences—for example, for or against certain body types or
physical features. It might seem perverse to courts to award greater
punitive damages for the disruption of centrally important but morally
questionable reproductive plans than less important but less objectionable
plans. On the other hand, the courts should not be in the business of passing
moral judgment on private reproductive plans. For these reasons, I think
it would be best to scale punitive damages within broad categories of
reproductive negligence only by the extent to which the defendant’s
conduct departed from the prevailing standard of care.
THE ROAD FOX TAKES, AND WHERE IT LEADS
Fox, however, does not go this way. He wants plaintiffs to be able to
seek compensation for the specific harms caused by the negligent
confounding of their reproductive plans. He favors compensation based
on “the magnitude and probability of frustrated interests in offspring
particulars.”5 He understands these as interests in preventing concrete
harms. So, in the case of health conditions that the parents had sought to
prevent, “courts should start with the foreseeable range of implications for
offspring lifespan, impairment, medical care, and treatment options. . . . the
reproductive injury will tend to be less serious for conditions whose
symptoms are milder, treatable, and uncertain to manifest.”6 Because
these injuries are tangible—financial costs, impaired functions, reduced
lifespan, pain, discomfort, or disruption, for example—they cannot be
offset by the intangible benefits of coming to love and cherish an initially
unwanted type of child.7

5.
6.
7.
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This may be a desirable practical outcome, but It lets in much of what
Fox tried to exclude in formulating the tort of reproductive negligence.
The parents are not suing only for the violation of their autonomy; they
are seeking, to use the legal phrase, “to be made whole;” to be compensated
to the extent possible for not getting what their agreement with the
provider entitled them to. In making this expectation the baseline for
recovery, they are affirming their interest in “offspring particulars” that
the defendant’s negligence denied them and treating the failure to get
those particulars as a harm. This is a problematic affirmation to the extent
the harm is inseparable from the child they love and cherish.
The problem in seeking compensatory damages—at least the one I am
concerned with—is not that it risks hurting the child’s feelings or eroding its
trust and self-esteem. Nor is it that it reflects or predicts insufficient
parental affection for or commitment to the child. Children may be too
young to appreciate their parents’ legal claims, or if older and secure in
parental love, may not care. Parents often fall in love with children of a
type they tried to avoid, lose any initial regrets they may have had about
getting that kind of child, and raise the child as lovingly and affectionately as
parents who were more welcoming prenatally.
The problem is simply that such parents act on attitudes and beliefs that
are inconsistent or in tension with the acceptance and love they now have
for their child. In the rest of this paper, I will not attempt to address claims
that such inconsistency or tension is hurtful or harmful to the child; I
will assume for the sake of argument that it is neither. Rather, I will
consider and reject accounts that attempt to deny this inconsistency or
tension. In doing so, I will sometimes sketch a hypothetical dialogue
between parent and child. My aim is to assess the adequacy the parent’s
attempt to reconcile their pursuit of compensatory damages with their
unqualified acceptance and love, not to suggest or predict whether the
words I put in their mouths would actually hurt or damage the children
who heard them.
There would be no need for reconciliation in a case where the parents
had not sought to avoid a particular kind of child, but merely to prepare
for the birth of such a child. An increasing number of prospective parents
state that they would seek prenatal testing, not to decide whether to continue
the pregnancy, but merely to make medical or financial preparations. For
example, if the fetus turned out to have Down syndrome, they would make
arrangements to give birth in a tertiary care hospital because of the greater
odds that it would need neonatal cardiac surgery. Or they might set aside

35

JCLI_23_WASSERMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/9/2021 1:22 PM

more money for more costly childcare and tutoring in a state with poor
“special education.” Such parents might incur substantial reliance costs if
the negligent diagnosis prevented them from making such preparations. It
would be hard to see any offense to their child in treating the harms of
unpreparedness as a recoverable injury.
In many or most cases of confounded procreation, however, there might
not be substantial reliance costs—and even if there were, recovering for
them would provide only a small fraction of the damages that would typically
be sought for negligent confounding. The eventual development of fetal
medicine for genetically based disability may dramatically increase the
costs of relying on a negligently mistaken diagnosis, because the child
may suffer significant harms from the failure to obtain effective prenatal
interventions. But at present, even the fullest preparation could not
significantly mitigate the kinds of injury for which Fox would allow
confounded plaintiffs to seek compensation.
The tension in this posture can be highlighted by comparing it to the
parents’ posture in demanding compensation for the same, or similar, harms
resulting from gestational negligence by a doctor who gave the mother a
drug he should have known was teratogenic. In that case, the parents’
demand would seem fully compatible with their avowed love and lack
of regret: their love for their child is not strained by treating as a compensable
injury a health condition that this child would have avoided had the doctor
exercised due care. In contrast, the confounded parents can’t claim that,
absent the doctor’s negligence, this child would not have had the injuries
for which they seek compensation: this child would never have been born.
Due care could not have resulted in their having this child without its
health condition; that was a practical impossibility.8
Now, one response is that in the case of confounded procreation, even
if the child could not have come into existence without its disability, the
plaintiffs can cherish the child but regret its disability. As loving parents, they
would seek to correct the disability if they could—except in the case of
certain disabilities so integral to the child’s identity that correction would
amount to repudiation or even replacement. But given the practical
impossibility of having had this child without its disability, the defendant’s
8. I am alluding here to the familiar non-identity problem. For a clear introduction, see,
Melinda A. Roberts, The Nonidentity Problem, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed.,
2020), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/nonidentity-problem/ [https://perma.cc/
LWT6-BCPW]. A parallel claim can be made where the confounding results in the
absence of genetic ties with the child. Even in cases of switched embryos, where this child
—the one the parents now love and cherish—could have existed without the doctor’s
negligence, it would have been born to, and raised by, different parents. It is o nly
marginally less disturbing to treat the child’s birth into the parent’s family as a harm than
to treat its very existence as a harm.
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negligence cannot be said to have caused that disability or any harm
resulting from it, except in causing or allowing this child, or a child with
this disability, to be born. The reproductive plan thwarted by negligence
sought to prevent the existence of any child with the condition this child
has, as the only feasible way to avoid the condition that this child has. In
seeking compensation for the condition, the plaintiffs are seeking to come
as close as possible to the fulfillment of a plan that would have precluded the
birth of this child.
Without entering a metaphysical briar patch, I want to acknowledge that
the extent to which the pursuit of damages constitutes an affirmation of
the thwarted plan varies with separability of the harm alleged from the
now-beloved child. Imagine a couple promised $100,000 by a parent if
and only if their first child is male; they detest the sexism (and may even
hope for a girl) but need the cash. Because of their doctor’s negligence,
they end up with a female child, with whom they immediately fall in love.
In suing the doctor for the $100,000, they are not only seeking to vindicate
their autonomy but to recover what they lost by the negligent disruption of
their enrichment plan. They want every dime they would have received if
the doctor had exercised due care and prevented the existence of a girl like
their beloved daughter.
And yet, in this case, their acceptance and welcome of their actual child
seems less qualified than in cases of a genetically based disability. They
desired a different type of child only because of its highly contingent
association with the money. It would have only required the benefactor’s
change of heart to disassociate the child’s sex from the cash. This is not
to say that their daughter, on learning of the lawsuit years later, would
have no reason to be disturbed, but she would have more reason to be
disturbed by her parents’ mercenary attitude, or their complicity, than by
their attitude toward female children. As I will argue below, parents who
tried to avoid having a child with a disability only because they could not at
that time afford adequate care arguably would face less tension in seeking
compensatory damages than would parents with a less contingent aversion to
having a disabled child.
AN AWKWARD POSTURE
As I have suggested, the parents’ demand for compensation in many
confounded procreation cases would be in tension with their unqualified
welcome and unconditional acceptance of the child for whose unavoidable
burdens and expenses they seek compensation. To highlight that tension,
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I’ll contrast the parental postures in three other types of confounding cases
that, while similar in some respects to those I’ve just characterized, are
easier to reconcile with unqualified love, welcome, and acceptance:
Tight budget: Imagine parents who had been at a life stage when they
could barely afford to raise one healthy child. They would be open to having
a child with a costly disability, or triplets, once they had established themselves
financially, moved out of their studio apartment, et cetera. But they want
the OB/GYN to ensure that this first time, they will not have a child with
a costly, genetically diagnosable disability, or multiple children. Assume
that they have accurately assessed the additional costs of both and have
done careful financial as well as reproductive planning. Such parents could
explain a reproductive negligence lawsuit to their children in the following
terms: “We just weren’t ready for a child like you/more than one child,
though we would have welcomed children like you/triplets all later on.
But we’re thrilled to have you now that you’re here, and the only reason
we’re suing is to get the money we need to raise you.”
The case of unwanted multiples is really one of procreation imposed,
not confounded, and an especially favorable one for avoiding offense.
The parents’ posture in such a case does not seem demeaning to any of
their children, in part because none of the three can be identified as one of
the unwanted ones. There’s no fact of the matter about which children
were unwanted; the parents wanted any one of them and no more. In
contrast, parents who did not want any child have assumed a slightly more
awkward posture toward the child imposed on them by the provider’s
negligence: while they were not seeking to avoid a specific type of child,
any child was unwelcome at that time. The awkwardness is still greater
in the case of a medically expensive child. In this case, the parents were
seeking to avoid the very type of child they ended up having. But even
here, there is less offense than in a typical case of confounded procreation:
the expensive child can be seen more like a guest who wasn’t unwelcome
but who arrived early, before the hosts were ready to receive guests. The
offense might be greater if the parents’ willingness to have such a child
was strictly hypothetical, however sincere—for example, parents mired in
chronic poverty who would happily bear such a child if, against all odds,
they ever became wealthy.
Holland Instead of Italy: This travel analogy is often used by advocates
for Down syndrome and other intellectual and developmental disabilities
(IDDs) to illustrate how the experience of raising a child with a disability
can be different without being worse: prospective parents may initially be
disappointed at arriving in the wrong country, but they will find Holland

38

JCLI_23_WASSERMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 23: 31, 2021]

11/9/2021 1:22 PM

Compensatory Damage Claims
THE JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES

quite enchanting and have little regret about their unexpected visit.9 We
can imagine parents who sought a particular kind of child and were initially
disappointed to end up with another. The easiest case would be one where,
despite a strong preference for a particular trait, they recognized that it
could be equally rewarding to have a child without it. This might well be
the case for parents who want their first child to be a boy, or a girl, but
have the reverse preference for their second child. Of course, such parents
would be unlikely to abort a fetus of the “wrong” sex, go through the trouble
and expense of sperm sorting or IVF to select the preferred sex, or to sue
the doctor if her negligence resulted in their getting a child of the “wrong”
sex.
Parents might feel more aggrieved if they had sought a particular trait,
like height or musicality, that could (I will assume) be selected for in
advance. They would be disappointed in ending up with a child of average
height or musical ability, even if they quickly discovered that they could
have just as rewarding a parenting experience with that child as one with
the desired trait. If they did not repudiate their initial preferences, however,
they would be affirming their preference for a child with “better” characteristics
than the one they got.
The analogy would be even less apt for parents who tried to avoid
having a child with Down syndrome, since they would clearly be selecting
against, rather than for, a specific kind of child. This may indeed be a
typical attitude for prospective parents, whether or not they actually pursue
testing. The familiar refrain, “as long as it has ten fingers and ten toes,”
makes clear that the parents would be content with a range of children—
that they are only seeking to avoid one lacking the standard complement
of digits, or similar “birth defects.”
Repudiation: Some parents might come to reject their initial opposition
to a child of a specific type after getting one. Such parents might be able
to seek redress for the provider’s negligence without offense to their child.
“We were mistaken in seeking to prevent the birth of a child [like the one
we now have], but even though we were mistaken, the provider had a duty
to respect our decision and exercise due care in implementing it. It breached
that duty and disrupted our reproductive planning. It should be sanctioned
for its negligence, though we now unambivalently welcome the outcome.”
As I claimed above, however, I don’t think that they could demand anything
9. See, e.g., JENNIFER GRAF GRONEBERG, ROAD MAP TO HOLLAND: HOW I FOUND
MY WAY THROUGH MY SON’S FIRST TWO YEARS WITH DOWN SYNDROME (2008).
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more than punitive damages and reliance costs. It would seem inconsistent
to seek compensation for costs that they now believe they should have
been willing to incur.
In contrast to the parents in Repudiation, the parents on whom I will
focus do not think they were mistaken in seeking to have a different type
of child. In contrast to the parents in Holland Instead of Italy, they were
not seeking to have a specific kind of child they didn’t get, but seeking to
avoid having the specific kind of child they got. And in contrast to the
parents in Tight Budget, they were unwilling not only to have such a child
at the present time, but at any time. Yet, like the parents in those cases,
these parents love and cherish the child they now have and do not wish
that they had a different child instead. Something has changed dramatically
in their evaluative landscape, but it is not something that compels them to
repudiate the reproductive plans they made, and which the provider’s
negligence disrupted. I want to situate these parents within a philosophical
debate about the coherence or consistency of prospective and retrospective
judgments, a debate that is not limited to reproduction.
RECONCILIATION ATTEMPTS
A variety of actions or decisions appear wrongful to the individual, not
only in prospect but in retrospect, yet bring about outcomes the individual
welcomes. Because of your race, you are denied a seat on a plane that
goes on to crash; a lifeguard wrongfully lets a large number of children
drown in order to effect a much easier rescue of one drowning child, who
turns out to be yours; the injuries inflicted by a drunk driver end your career
as a mediocre runner and enable you to instead become a great artist; you
carelessly disregard your doctor’s instructions to delay pregnancy for
several months until you recover from rubella, and, as a result, have a
severely disabled child that you dearly love; because of the Final Solution,
your Jewish grandparents, from opposite ends of the continent, meet in a
displaced-persons camp.
These cases vary in whether the same individual or entity is the wrongdoer
and the beneficiary; in whether the wrongdoer intends or expects to confer
the benefits, and in whether the benefit is the individuals’ existence or
survival. What they share is an apparent tension between condemning the
wrongdoing and accepting a benefit for which it seems to have been necessary.
In some of these cases, that benefit is unforeseen by the beneficiary and
unintended by the wrongdoer, which makes it easier to accept the benefit
while blaming the wrongdoer. Neither the victim nor perpetrator of
discrimination expected the plane to crash, and that prospect was not the
reason the victim was barred from the flight. The victim hardly treats his
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survival as less welcome in condemning his racist exclusion.10 I would
say something similar in the Final Solution case, although others see the
tension as far less tractable.11 Things are trickier in the lifeguard case. Had
the parent known that the one child who would be saved by the easier
rescue would be his own, he might have had reasons of partiality to urge
the lifeguard to do just what she did; lacking that knowledge, his partiality
entitles him to welcome the “suboptimal” outcome. Although it would be
awkward for him to condemn the lifeguard’s action retrospectively, his
relief at the outcome places no pressure on him to oppose her condemnation
by third parties who are unconstrained by his partiality to the rescued
child.
The most vexing cases for my purposes are those where you (the
individual) expect, or should expect, that you will not regret the outcome
of the wrongful conduct, because of the way it will change your values or
perspective, yet you still believe, after these changes in your values or
perspective, that the conduct that led to those changes was wrongful.
Moreover, you do not believe prospectively that you will be mistaken or
deluded in changing your values. In the context of reproductive negligence,
these are cases where: i) the plaintiffs sought to avoid giving birth to a
child, or a type of child, even though they expected that they would love,
cherish, and have no regrets about having a child, or a child of that type;
ii) the defendant’s negligence causes them to have a child, or such a child;
and iii) as they expected, they now love the child they have and do not
wish they had no child, or a different child, instead; yet iv) they do not
think they were mistaken in trying to prevent the existence of a child, or
that type of child, and in seeking compensation for the negligence which
thwarted their attempt.12

10.
11.

See James Woodward, The Non-Identity Problem, 96 ETHICS 804, 810–11 (1986).
Saul Smilansky, Morally, Should We Prefer Never to Have Existed?, 91
AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 655, 655–66 (2013).
12. If having an unwanted type of child can be said to be a transformative experience,
or a transformative experience fundamentally different from having a wanted child, it
seems more personally than epistemically transformative (Laurie Paul’s distinction,
LAURIE ANN PAUL, TRANSFORMATIVE EXPERIENCE (2014)) in the cases I’ve described.
Prospectively, the woman or couple expect that they will love and cherish the child and
lack regret about its birth. They expect that the experience, which they seek to avoid, will
be personally transformative, in changing their values and attachments. While the actual
experience of having the child may itself have been epistemically inaccessible, the
judgments arising from that experience were not; the prospective parents were correct (and
justified) in predicting how they would judge the outcome.
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I think we can gain insight into these cases by considering the attempts
made by philosophers to defend the coherence of parents’ attitudes towards
their own past actions in cases where those actions, not those of a provider,
results in their having a child with a serious disability. In these “parental
negligence” cases, the providers advise reproductive delay or selection to
prevent disability. It is the parents, acting Against Medical Advice, who
bring about the birth of a disabled child. No one violates their reproductive
autonomy; it is freely, if poorly, exercised.13 But these cases raise much
the same question as cases of reproductive negligence: whether the parents’
lack of regret for the expected consequences of past conduct—whether
their own or a third party’s—constrains the attitude they can hold or the
response they can make to that past conduct.
Several heroic efforts have been made to deny such constraints: to deny
that it is inconsistent for parents to insist that they were correct in seeking
to prevent the existence of a type of child they do not regret having and
knew they would not regret having. I will suggest that the stronger the grounds
the parents have for affirming their present attitudes toward the child, the
weaker their grounds for affirming the judgments they defied in bringing
it into existence.
Here, then, are three notable attempts to defend the compatibility of
present parental attitudes toward their child and their past judgments, in a
way that permits the parents to affirm those judgments without impugning
their love for that child or their unalloyed joy at having him.
For David Velleman, consistency between prospective and retrospective
judgments in such cases is preserved because of a fundamental difference
in the reference of those judgments:
[T]here are no persons whose existence as such ought to have been prevented.
Whatever persons there are, are worthy of being treasured. It’s the persons that
aren’t whose existence ought to be prevented, and they are nobody in particular,
or at least nobody we can point to. Of persons we can point to, the most we can
say in that insofar as others might be like them, they—those faceless others—
should not be brought into existence. And as soon as there is anyone whose existence
might be disparaged by this conclusion, the conclusion falls to the ground and the
person should rather be welcomed into the world”.14

13. I believe that prospective parents can have a variety of good reasons for declining to
delay or select to avoid having a child with a disability. But in this literature, the refusal
to delay or select is assumed to be wrongful. The issue of consistency obviously will not
arise for parents happy to have a child with a disability that they refused to select against,
for reasons they continue to endorse.
14. J. David Velleman, Not Alive Yet, in DISABILITY IN PRACTICE: ATTITUDES, POLICIES,
AND RELATIONSHIPS 91, 94–95 (Adam Cureton & Thomas E. Hill eds., 2018).
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This strikes me as little more than a sleight-of-hand. A child, however
loved and valued once he can be “pointed to” (in Kripke’s terms, “rigidly
designated”), could reasonably be offended to discover that his parents
believed, and still believe, that they should have prevented the existence
of others “like him.” If he were to ask, “how do I differ from those “faceless
others” whose existence you still think should be prevented?” the Kripkean
answer is hardly reassuring: “Because we can now rigidly designate you,
and encounter you in a way that makes it possible to love you, rather than
just refer to you by a definite description.” The child’s parents clearly
devalue those “faceless others” like him, a devaluation he avoids only because
he is accessible to them as a particular person and “they” are not. This
difference in reference, or, per Velleman, in “mode of presentation,” hardly
offers the child a satisfactory explanation of how their past actions were
compatible with their present attitudes.
Kieran Setiya emphasizes a metaphysically more robust difference: this
child exists, while those other do not. In a case where the parents have a
disabled child, but could have had a different, nondisabled child if they
waited, Setiya argues:
In general, what you should want or do is fixed by the balance of reasons. Since
what you should prefer beforehand differs from what you should prefer now,
there must have been a shift in the reasons for or against. There must be a new
reason to prefer not having waited, one you did not have before the decision was
made; or one of the reasons you had back then must no longer apply. 15

Setiya finds the reason in the simple fact that the child exists. He maintains
that the child’s existence gives not only his parents but all other coexisting
people reason to prefer his existence—a reason they did not have at the
time the prospective parents did their reproductive planning.
To know that someone presently exists is to know that she coexists with you.
Such coexistence makes a moral demand. Part of being on good terms with your
coexistents is to affirm their lives and so to prefer that they exist. 16

This affirmation, however, does not seem to offer the child a more
satisfactory response than Velleman’s. To his question: “How do I differ
from those you still believe should not be brought into existence?” the
Anselmian answer, “You exist,” is hardly convincing given the parents’
continued belief that the balance of reasons “back then” favored waiting

15.
16.

Kieran Setiya. The Ethics of Existence, 28 PHIL. PERSP. 291, 295 (2014).
Id. at 299.
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until they could have a different, nondisabled child. At the risk of treating
existence as a predicate, the child could object that he warrants unqualified
love and acceptance only because of his privileged ontological status;
because he belongs to the “in-group” of coexistents. He is left with the
unsettling thought that his parents’ reason to welcome him, a (type of)
child that the balance of reasons opposed, is the bare fact that he exists, a
fact that obtains only because of the provider’s negligence.
I should note that this tension seems greater in the case of confounded
than imposed procreation, since in the latter, the parents are not seeking
to avoid a type of child. There seems to be something far less personal in
cases where the parents did not want any child, even if they did not want
one for principled reasons that they continue to affirm. Consider a child
who learns that his parents tried not to have any children because of their
conviction, which they continue to hold, that people should stop procreating
because of overpopulation. While the child may feel some slight guilt or
shame in adding to that overpopulation, his parents’ welcome is the inverse
or complement of the welcome given by confounded parents: there is nothing
about him they would have tried, or would try, to prevent except his existence,
and that, being given, can no longer be regretted.
The final reconciliation attempt I will discuss comes from David
Sussman. While Setiya claims that the child’s very existence provides a
balance-tipping reason, unavailable in prospect, for preferring that the
child exists, Sussman contends that its existence so fundamentally alters
the parent’s outlook that the importance of its life is “something that can’t
be called into question. . . . You [the child] have become part of the outlook
from which I can recognize something as good or bad in the first place,
not one of the things that might be so regarded itself.”17 In the case of
parents who had a disabled child against their better judgment, there is no
simple yes or no answer to the question of whether they would do it again.
“As they are now, their relationship to their child is an essential aspect of
how they understand themselves and of what options they can recognize
as real options for them. Although they can say it was wrong to have this
child, they deny that it was wrong to have had him” (my emphasis).18
Sussman’s account may come closer than the others to giving the parents
a satisfying explanation of how they can unambivalently affirm a child’s
existence while not repudiating their prospective judgment that it would
be wrong to have a child like him. They can no longer even question
whether the child’s life is good or bad, because its life is an essential part
17. David Sussman, Respect, Regret, and Reproductive Choice, in DISABILITY IN
PRACTICE: ATTITUDES, POLICIES, AND RELATIONSHIPS 105, 112–13 (Adam Cureton & Thomas
E. Hill eds., 2018).
18. Id.
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of their evaluative framework, not something that can be evaluated. Yet
if they can still say that it was wrong to have this child, they can surely
say that the provider was wrong to have negligently caused them to have
it. That still leaves the question, though, of how they can seek compensation
from that provider for “damages” that they can no longer regard as harms.
It is unclear that they can claim any harm from that negligence when they
cannot evaluate its outcome as good or bad. Since the outcome of the
negligence is part of the outlook from which they regard things as good
or bad, it is, as Sussman would have it, beyond evaluation, and therefore,
arguably, beyond compensation.
But perhaps this very distance from their former selves would enable
Sussman’s parents to adopt an objective attitude toward their plan. That
attitude would enable them to act on behalf of their past selves, as trustees
for a plan they cannot endorse but are dutybound to vindicate. Their past
selves would be like close relatives, whose thwarted decisions they had an
obligation to enforce—an obligation imposed by their relationship. In this
role, they can seek damages without offense to their child; they would
act like lawyers zealously advocating for a client whose views they do not
share. But if they analogy works, it may only work for punitive damages.
It’s mysterious how their former selves could be compensated for damages
they don’t have to bear but which are borne by their continuers /trustees,
who would thereby receive compensation for “damages” they do not regard
as harms.
Sussman’s account may, then, offer the child a somewhat more satisfying
explanation than Setiya’s or Velleman’s of how the parents can unambivalently
welcome its existence while continuing to believe that it should have been
prevented. But if it does, it also, as I suggested, casts doubt on their
demand for compensation. This is true as well of Setiya’s account, which
requires affirmation of the child’s existence not only by its parents but by
all coexistents, including, presumably, the judges who hear lawsuits. That
affirmation would not be undermined by giving the negligent provider a
judicial slap on the wrist for disrupting the parents’ reproductive plan, but
it would be hard to square with compensation for the expected and endorsed
consequences of that disruption. Velleman’s approach, the least satisfactory
for the child, not surprisingly appears the most congenial to damage recovery.
In claiming the parents are “doomed to love”19 a severely disabled child
they sought to avoid, Velleman can be seen as treating the negligent act
19.

David J. Velleman, Persons in Prospect, 36 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 221, 272 (2008).
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as responsible not only for the various burdens of raising the child, but for
the parent’s unconditional willingness to bear those burdens. To make
this claim, however, the parents would have to adopt an observer’s “objective
attitude” toward their own present values and attachments.
CONCLUSION
I’ve been focusing very narrowly on the consistency of the set of
attitudes that the plaintiffs in many confounded procreation cases appear
committed to holding. I have questioned the compatibility of demanding
compensation for the damages that parents incurred because the provider
negligently caused the birth of their present child—a birth they do not
regret and a child they love and cherish. I think there is little prospect for
coming up with a “theory of the case” that would justify compensatory
damages for the parents in a way that is fully consistent with their unqualified
acceptance and love for the child. For this reason, I find it problematic
for parents to seek compensation for the disruption of their reproductive
plans.
I do not think, however, that this inconsistency will often provide an allthings-considered reason for eschewing compensatory damages. Parents
rarely seek those damages to enrich themselves; in most cases, they are
merely trying to ensure that they will have the financial resources to take
care of a type of child they never intended to raise—resources they require
because of the provider’s negligence. Adopting a morally awkward posture
may be a small price for securing the resources needed to adequately
support a severely disabled child. It would be presumptuous to insist that
such parents forego needed resources rather than press claims that are
inconsistent with unqualified acceptance and love. Indeed, the tort regime
Fox proposes may be fully justified in a decidedly non-ideal world where
the support for raising disabled children is woefully inadequate.
Although I think that parents should in many cases pursue compensatory
damages for reproductive negligence, I also think the state should reduce
their incentive to do so—not by making it hard for them to make those
claims, but by making it much easier for them than it now is to raise a child
with the kind of condition they sought to avoid, substantially reducing the
costs for which they would be entitled to seek compensation. There would
hardly be much moral hazard in more generous state funding for the
additional expenses of raising additional children or a child with a significant
disability. The fertility rates in countries with the most extensive social
welfare systems, like Denmark, Sweden, and the Benelux nations, have been

46

JCLI_23_WASSERMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 23: 31, 2021]

11/9/2021 1:22 PM

Compensatory Damage Claims
THE JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES

declining for decades,20 and in those countries, with both far better state
funding for the education and support of people with Down syndrome
than in the U.S., and far greater access to abortion, the termination rate for
diagnosed cases of Down is—for better or worse—consistently over 90%.21
Adopting such extensive social welfare provisions, for which I believe there
is compelling independent justification, would also have the desirable effect
of sparing many victims of reproductive negligence the need to adopt a
legal posture that was, on its face, inconsistent with the unqualified acceptance
and love for their children that they regarded as a parental ideal—if not
always a reality.

20. OECD, FERTILITY RATES (INDICATOR) (2021), https://data.oecd.org/pop/fertilityrates.htm [https://perma.cc/3PZJ-72Z6].
21. Suellen Hopfer et al., Termination Rates After Prenatal Diagnosis of Down Syndrome,
Spina Bifida, Anencephaly, and Turner and Klinefelter Syndromes: A Systematic Literature
Review, 19 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 808, 808–12 (1999).
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